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Résumé. Le présent article interroge la décision individuelle de voter ou de s’abstenir 
aux  élections  européennes  de  2014  dans  sept  pays  membres  de  l’UE.  Nous  nous 
focalisons sur le rôle des caractéristiques démographiques et des attitudes. L’analyse 




entre  hommes  et  femmes  dans  la  participation  aux  européennes.  Nous  trouvons 
également que l’afirmation d’une identité européenne favorise la participation tandis 
que  la  performance  de  l’UE,  telle  que  perçue  par  les  répondants,  n’a  pas  d’impact. 
Enin, il n’y a pas de différences dans les déterminants du vote entre le « Nord » et le 
« Sud » ou entre les pays membres fondateurs et ceux qui ont adhéré plus récemment.
Mots-clés :  attitudes,  déterminants  de  la  participation  électorale,  écart  hommes-
femmes, élections européennes de 2014, identité européenne.
THE DECISION TO VOTE OR ABSTAIN 
IN THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS




The 2014 European elections were exceptional in at least three respects. It 
were the irst to be held according to the rules laid down in the Lisbon Treaty, 
the irst that followed the worst inancial and economic crisis since 1929 and, 
inally, the irst in which most major European political forces declared a 
candidate for the presidency of the European Commission (the Spitzenkandidat). 
Yet, those who hoped that this exceptionality would boost citizens’ electoral 
zeal and counter the long-term downwards turnout trend that had characte-
rized the European elections since 1979 could be nothing but disappointed. 
The inal turnout rate decreased by an additional 0.5 percentage point when 
compared to the previous election of 2009 and reached an all-time low of 
42.5%, far below the voter turnout average in legislative elections held in esta-
blished democracies (74%, see Blais, 2007, p.624). This low voting rate, combi-
ned with the supranational nature of the contest, raises questions about the 
determinants of turnout. What are the social and political mechanisms that 
drive electoral participation in the European elections? Are they the same as in 
national elections or are they speciic? 
In this article we examine the individual decision to vote or abstain in 
the 2014 European elections in seven countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Austria, Greece, and Portugal. We look at the impact of two sets of variables: 
socio-demographic characteristics and attitudinal factors. With respect to the 
former we focus on the impact of age, gender, and education. With respect to 
the latter, we consider two sets of attitudes. The irst is the level of interest in 
politics, a general attitude that indicates the degree of psychological engagement, 
which should predispose people to participate in any election. The second set 
comprises two attitudes that are speciic to the European election, that is, indivi-
duals’ identiication (or lack of it) with the European Union on the one hand and 
their assessment of the performance of the European Union on the other hand. 
We have three main objectives in this study. The irst is to estimate the 
speciic overall impact of each of these variables in the combined data set, as 
such and relative to each other. The second is to determine the extent to which 
the patterns do or do not vary across countries, and more speciically whether 
the determinants of turnout vary depending on the age of democracy, the 
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amount of time since the country joined the EU, or the severity of the economic 
crisis. The third, as mentioned above, is to specify whether the determinants 
of turnout are diferent in a supra-national election, compared to “irst-order” 
national elections. We should add that such a comparison will not be as systema-
tic as we would wish, since we do not possess comparable data for the decision 
to vote or abstain in national elections. We will rather indicate to what extent 
our indings seem to replicate or not those that have been reported in previous 
research, which has mostly focused on participation in national elections.
We use the Comparative EU Election data set, with about 4 000 respondents 
in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Austria, and 1 000 in Greece and Portugal. 
The total sample is about 22 000. The median reported turnout in these seven 
countries is 65%, the highest being in Greece (83%) and the lowest in Portugal 
(55%)1. Reported turnout is about 20 percentage points higher than the oicial 
turnout, the gap being due irst and foremost to the fact that those least interes-
ted in politics and most likely to abstain are least likely to respond to political 
surveys and secondly to some abstainers not willing to admit they had not voted 
(Blais, 2000, chapter 2). Interestingly, the gap between the reported and the actual 
turnout is basically the same in all seven countries, ranging from 19 to 23 points.
We move in two steps, starting with socio-demographic characteristics and 
then moving to consider attitudinal variables. In each case, we focus on a parsi-
monious set of three variables of particular interest. Concerning socio-demogra-
phic characteristics, we consider age, education, and gender. Age and education 
usually emerge as the two most powerful socio-economic variables when it comes 
to predicting turnout (Blais, 2000; Nevitte et al., 2009). The relationship between 
age and turnout is usually construed to be curvilinear, that is, turnout increases 
with age until between 60 and 70, and then declines, possibly because of greater 








should note that the impact of age may relect two distinct efects, generational 
and life-cycle (Blais et al., 2004), which we will not be able to sort out in this 
study, because of the cross-sectional nature of the data set. As for education, we 
will simply contrast those with low and high education, the latter being those 
with a post-secondary education. Education is usually the second strongest predic-
tor of turnout (among SES variables), though there is doubt about whether this 
relects the impact of schooling as such or simply the efect of prior cognitive 
abilities (see Persson, 2014). At the same time, however, the educational gap varies 
immensely across countries (Gallego, 2015). It will be interesting to see whether 
the same pattern applies in European elections.
We also include gender. There used to be a substantial gender gap in turnout, 
women being more likely to abstain but that gap has more or less disappeared 
in most countries (Norris, 2002). At the same time, however, women seem to 
be less inclined to vote in European elections (Soderlund et al., 2011). We will 
determine whether we observe the same pattern in our data set.
In a second step, we explore the role of three political attitudes: politi-
cal interest, political identity, and evaluations of the EU. Political interest is 
perhaps the most obvious motivation for voting. Following Brady et al.’s (1995) 
apt characterization, people participate because they want to, they are able to, 
and/or they are asked to. This psychological predisposition, sometime called 
psychological engagement, is often equated with the level of interest in poli-
tics. When one likes politics one wants to participate, and the most obvious 
political act is voting. This is our irst basic attitude, which refers to the initial 
willingness to participate in any election3.
But we are dealing here with the decision to vote or not in a European elec-
tion, and that decision should also depend on how one feels about Europe. We 
expect those who have a strong attachment to Europe to be more prone to vote 





even hostile to be inclined to stay home4. In the same manner, those who 
perceived the EU to be a useful institution should be more prone to participate 
in the election of its Parliament than those who are sceptical or even convinced 
it is incompetent and/or harmful5.
Our task will be to gauge the relative impact of these three attitudes, to 
ascertain whether their impact varies across the seven countries, and to explore 
interaction efects between them.
1.WHO VOTES?
Table 1 shows the relationship between age, gender, and education and repor-
ted turnout, in the pooled data set and in each of the seven countries. We should 
point out that we dropped in all our analyses the 204 respondents (1% of the 
sample) who are not citizens of their country of residence. Turnout is substanti-
ally lower among non-citizens (the gap is 18 percentage points in our sample) in 
good part because non-citizens (who are citizens of another EU country) have to 
register for this election since they do not have the right to vote in national elec-
tions. They are thus a very special group, in which the determinants of turnout 
are quite diferent (Wass et al., forthcoming), and we prefer to focus on the typi-
cal situation whereby a citizen has to decide whether to vote or not.
Table 1 indicates that turnout was lower among women than among men 
in each of the seven countries (controlling for age and education). The overall 
gap was 4 percentage points, and it was stronger in France, Austria, and Greece. 
This is in line with the inding by Soderlund et al. (2011) that women appear 
to be particularly less prone to vote in European elections. One possibility is 





burden,  public  debts  and  deicits,  immigration,  climate  change):  “Do  you  think  European 




that the issues that are dealt with at the European level are perceived to be less 
salient by women. We are not able to directly test that hypothesis here. But 
it will be interesting to see whether the gender gap is explained by the three 
attitudes that will be explored in the next section.
Table 1. Socio-demographic Characteristics

















































































































21348 3843 3871 3871 3948 1002 966 3866
pseudo r2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03
Note: marginal effects are calculated holding the other covariates at their respective means.   
+ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05 **; p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
Without much surprise, the better educated are more likely to vote than 
the less educated. In the overall pooled sample, the gap between the two 
groups (after controlling for age and gender) is 13 percentage points. As expec-
ted, education is a more powerful determinant than gender. The pattern is 
the same in each of the seven countries, though it is particularly strong in 
Germany and Austria and relatively weak in Portugal, Greece and Spain. 
There is some similarity with the patterns established by Gallego (2015, 
Figures 1-4) who examines the degree of unequal participation in national 
elections in 85 elections across the world. More speciically, Germany also 
stands out in her analysis as a country with strong inequality and Spain as 
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one of the least unequal. Gallego attributes these diferences in good part to 
the simplicity/complexity of the voting procedure. Spain has a simple voting 
system in which people vote for a closed list while Germans have two separate 
votes on for a local candidate in their constituency and one for a party list6. The 
German system for the European elections is much simpler (closed PR list) and 
so the same explanation does not apply here.
Table 1 conirms, inally, that the propensity to vote increases with age 
(see also Figure 1 for an illustration). All in all, in our pooled sample, turnout 
is 16 percentage points higher at age 50 than at age 20. Surprisingly, there is 
no clear evidence of a curvilinear pattern, however, whereby turnout declines 
after a certain age. We would not put too much emphasis on this, as the inter-
net survey may not be as representative of the older segment of the population. 
What is clear, however, is that in each country, those aged 50 or 60 are much 
more likely to vote than those aged 20. Interestingly, the only country where 
the relationship with age is weak is Italy (Figures 2, and 3)7.
In a recent study Bhatti et al. (2012) show that the relationship between age 
and turnout may be more complicated than usually assumed. More speciically, 
their data indicate that turnout is actually relatively high at age 18 and declines 
between 18 and 20 before starting to rise again. We do observe in our pooled 
data set, however, that turnout is very stable between 18 and 24, hovering 
around 60%8. The increase in turnout appears to start only from 25 years on.
Age and education are therefore relatively strongly correlated with the 
propensity to vote in the European election. In the case of age, perhaps the 
most striking result is that the increase in turnout seems to start only at about 









the lack of representativeness of our sample among the oldest fraction of our 
sample. Finally, it seems that the traditional gender gap (women being less 
likely to vote) has not completely disappeared in European elections, though it 
should be stressed that this gap is quite modest.
Figure 1. The Efect of Age on the Probability of Voting – Aggregated Analysis
Note: predicted probabilities are based on the regression model from Table 1. 
Figure 2. The Efect of Age on the Probability of Voting - Country Analysis (I) 
Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the regression models from Table 1.
Revue européenne des sciences sociales 87
Figure 3. The Efect of Age on the Probability of Voting - Country Analysis (II) 
Note: predicted probabilities are based on the regression models from Table 1.
There are of course some cross-national variations in these relationships 
between socio-demographic characteristics and turnout. As mentioned above, 
age is a weak predictor of voting in Italy, education is particularly strongly 
correlated with turnout in Germany, and gender plays a greater role in France 
and Austria. These diferences, however, are relatively minor, relative to the 
common patterns that emerge everywhere. Furthermore, there is no evidence of 
a “North” versus “South” or original versus more recent member state cleavage. 
2.WHY NOT VOTING?
It is useful to know who is most and least likely to vote but it is also impor-
tant to understand why. In this study, we focus on three potential attitudes that 
may lead people to abstain. The irst is lack of political interest. According to 
Brady et al. (1995) one’s general level of interest in politics is the most powerful 
predictor of the decision to vote or not, and we thus include this basic attitude 
in our model. But we are concerned with participation in a European election and 
we thus wish to determine whether some Europe-related attitudes also come into 
play. We have selected two of these attitudes. The irst is the presence or absence 
of a European identity. It is easy to see that those who have no attachment to 
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Europe may see no good reason to vote in a European election. The second atti-
tude concerns one’s evaluation of the performance of the EU as an institution. 
Many people view the EU as an ineicient institution and may see little use in 
participating in the selection of representatives in an organization whose contri-
bution to solving concrete problems is deemed to be dismal. Our goal is thus to 
determine whether each of these attitudes is indeed correlated with the decision 
to vote or abstain and which is the most inluential.
For the sake of simplicity we have dichotomized each variable. We thus test 
whether those with relatively high interest in politics (6 or above on the 0 to 10 
scale), with a European identity, and with a positive assessment of the EU perfor-
mance (an average score higher than 5 on the 0 to 10 scale) are indeed more 
likely to vote. All in all, 59% of the total sample are considered to be interested 
in politics, 65% have an European identity, and 32% positively evaluate the EU.
Table 2 presents the indings, which are pretty clear. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the performance variable is not signiicant, neither in the pooled data set nor in 
any of the seven countries. In fact it has even an unexpected negative sign. This 
suggests that the main reason for the low turnout in the European election is not 
the perception that the EU is an ineicient institution. That perception does exist 
but it is not associated with a greater propensity to abstain.
Table 2. Socio-demographic Characteristics & Attitudes–Baseline














































































































































































21303 3834 3865 3845 3865 999 961 3859
pseudo r2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05
Note: marginal effects are calculated holding the other covariates at their respective means.
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p< 0.001.
The two other attitudes, interest and identity, are clearly signiicant, and 
they are signiicant in every country, with the exception of Greece, where 
European identity does not appear to matter and the impact of political interest 
is also particularly weak. The fact that attitudes have so little inluence in Greece 
might be related to the fact that voting is formally compulsory (though without 
any sanction) in that country. Table 2 also clearly shows that political interest 
matters much more than interest. Everything else being equal, the probability 
of voting is 17 percentage points higher among those with relatively high inte-
rest. The equivalent efect of European identity is only 8 percentage points. And 
these efects vary only little across countries (with the exception of Greece).
These results indicate that the lower turnout observed in European elec-
tions may be partly imputed to the absence of a European identity among 
some citizens. But clearly this is just one factor among many. According to our 
estimates, turnout would increase by only 3 percentage points (.08 X 35% with 
no European identity) if everyone had a European identity.
We may ask whether these attitudes account for the socio-demographic 
efects documented in the previous section. The short answer is: partly. We 
can see that the small gender gap completely vanishes when we introduce 
these attitudes. Additional analyses not shown here indicate that the crucial 
variable is political interest; this is the variable that “causes” the gender coef-
icient to become insigniicant. The proportion of politically interested is only 
52% among women, while it reaches 67% among men. Political interest is 
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also an important reason why the better educated are more likely to vote but 
the educational gap remains substantial even after controlling for interest and 
identity. And inally the impact of age is largely unafected by the inclusion of 
these attitudes. Clearly other factors would have to be considered in order to 
explain the impact of age and education.
Lastly, we may wonder whether there is an interaction efect between poli-
tical interest and EU identity. There are two possibilities. The irst is that EU 
identity compensates for the lack of interest. If it were so, the presence of EU 
identity would matter most among those least interested, and thus the interac-
tive identity X Interest variable would have a (signiicant) negative coeicient. 
Or, contrarily, EU identity could be “required” in combination with political 
interest. If it were so, the presence or absence of EU identity would have the 
greatest impact among the most interested, and the identity X interest interac-
tion would have a (signiicant) positive coeicient. 
Table 3. Socio-demographic Characteristics & Attitudes–Interacted Model
aggregated 
analysis

















































































































































































observations 21303 3834 3865 3940 3940 999 961 3859
pseudo r2 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06
Note: + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
We test these two hypotheses in Table 3. We can see that the indings 
conirm the second hypothesis, with a signiicant positive interaction efect. 
This positive interaction efect emerges in each of the seven countries except 
Spain. This indicates that a sense of European identity hardly compensates for 
the lack of political interest. It is rather that it helps a lot to have both political 
interest and some attachment to Europe; the combined impact of these two 
attitudes is greater than the addition of their individual independent efects.
CONCLUSION
We have examined the socio-demographic and attitudinal correlates of the 
decision to vote or abstain in the 2014 European elections in seven countries. 
Many of the indings replicate patterns that have been observed in national 
elections. Turnout increases with age and education, and it is strongly correla-
ted with one’s general interest in politics. Turnout is lower in European than 
in national elections, for many reasons that we have not been able to examine 
in this paper, the most obvious one being that the European Parliament deals 
with issues (such as regulation) that are less salient to most citizens than the 
issues debated in national parliaments. Nevertheless, the European election 
is… an election, and the usual factors that come into play in citizens’ willin-
gness to vote in a national election are also at work in the European elections. 
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That being said, there are some distinctive patterns. Contrary to what we 
observe in national elections, there is a small gender gap, women being more 
prone to abstain, which is essentially due to their lower interest in politics. 
This suggests that lack of interest is more crucial for participation in elec-
tions of low salience (the European ones) than in those of high salience (the 
national ones). We also see that those who feel no attachment to the EU are 
less prone to vote. It is important to point out, however that this efect is quite 
small, and does little to explain the much lower participation rate in the EU 
elections. Similarly, we ind that evaluations of the performance of the EU 
with respect to a host of issues do not appear to have an independent efect 
on the turnout decision. Among other things, these results imply that, those 
who wish to counter the declining voter turnout trend in European elections 
should not invest too much efort in transforming European citizens’ attitudes 
and perceptions through (pro-European) political marketing. Instead, a more 
eicient strategy will be to increase the salience of European elections in the 
eyes of both voters and political parties. 
Finally, we are struck with the lack of cross-national variation in the deter-
minants of turnout. The patterns that we have uncovered are amazingly similar 
across each of the seven countries included in our study. For instance, educa-
tion is positively correlated with turnout in each of the seven countries, political 
interest matters more than EU identity in every country, evaluations of the EU 
performance do not have a positive efect in any country, and there is a positive 
interaction efect between identity and interest in every country except Spain.
There are of course some exceptions, but they appear mostly idiosyncratic. 
There is no evidence of a North/South cleavage nor is there is evidence that 
the factors that afect turnout are any diferent in the countries democratized 
and/or joined the EU earlier. Whether one votes or not seems to depend very 
much on the usual suspects: how old the person is, how educated she is, and 
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